Spain: 4-6-0 formation: A revolution in the making?

In his debut article for The Football Front Thomas Payne evaluates Spain's 4-6-0 formation.

The eventual winners Spain were criticised recurrently during the recent European Championships for their lack of goals considering the plenteous and lengthy spells of possession as well as the quality of their team. La Roja's tiki-taka football was branded as "boring" by the media, due to the lack of chances created in the final third.

The predominant reason for their 'dull' football was their formation, as Del Bosque used a formation similar to a 4-6-0, with Fabregas being (on paper) their highest position player. Despite being listed as a striker in this formation, the Barcelona midfielder played a false 9 role, in which he dropped deep into midfield, meaning that Spain were without a forward quite often throughout matches.

This innovative system allows teams to dominate the midfield, as you'd expect with 6 midfielders and supported Spain's aim to control matches with possession.

However, since they sacrificed playing a striker to dominate more of the middle of the park, the long spells of possession that they had rarely had an end product. This was due to the fact that there was no one to receive through balls into the final third, since the forwards played a lot of the time deeper alongside the trio in the middle of the park.

Origins of the 4-6-0 

The birthplace of many tactical innovations is Italy, this great footballing nation is the home of the libero, the regista, and is where Lionel Messi's role, the false 9 was created. The latter of these positions was actually invented in the 4-6-0 system, at AS Roma by their manager at the time, Luciano Spalletti. Unlike Spain's 4-6-0, this formation was used for counter-attacking purposes, as the Italian side looked to score on the break through their men on the flanks.

Spalletti was somewhat forced to invent this formation, due to a lack of strikers during a small injury crisis at the club and it brought them success, and despite the forwards coming back from their injuries, Spalletti continued to use this system.

Could it Work on a long Term Basis? 

Within both examples of teams playing a 4-6-0, they used the formation temporarily. It was Spalletti's solution to an injury crisis, whilst Del Bosque only used it in the European Championships. We have yet to see a 4-6-0 be effective throughout a long period of time. The reasons to the failings of this formation lies up front, without a striker teams can dominate the possession stat, whilst creating few chances. There is no forward to make the runs behind the defence, to serve as an outlet for the through balls of Silva, Iniesta, Xavi, and Alonso.

This problem was exposed in La Roja's opening match against Italy, despite having 66% of the possession, they only scored one goal. This goal came from a run from deep and behind the Italian defence, something which they lacked throughout the tournament.

As you can see in the diagram, most of Spain's passes in the final third were short, and there aren't many through balls, which resulted in a lack of chances created for the side.

To counter this lack of penetration, the wingers need to be good goalscorers, like Mirko Vucinic in Roma's system, the Montenegrin was positioned on the left flank by Spalletti despite being a natural striker, where he now plays for Juventus.

On the attack, the side also has to get numbers forward. The front three should always be in advanced positions when their team is putting pressure on the opposition. This means that there will always be players making runs from deep and looking to make themselves available for the piercing through balls supplied by their teammates in midfield.

How it Could Work 

The 4-6-0 is a good formation for both counter-attacking and possession football. The compact midfield allows you to sit deep without giving the opposition too much space to work with, this also allows for quick and short passes to move the ball upfield, since every player is in close range of each other.

Like in the Roma side, the wingers need to be competent goalscorers to make sure you don't lack too much firepower up front. The two central midfielders also need to support the attack to make sure the players up top don't get isolated, whilst the holding midfielder behind them can either play as a destroyer (if you're in a counter-attacking side) or a regista if you're playing possession football.

This article was written by Thomas Payne. You can follow him on Twitter: @tacticalterrier  . Check out his blog too: tacticalterrier.blogspot.co.uk

An Assessment of Chelsea..

In his debut article for The Football Front, Chinmay Pandya evaluates Chelsea’s tactics in the first half of the Premier League season.

Chelsea’s new year could not have been worse as the blues greet it with a yet another disastrous defeat at home. Critics will not fail to point out the frailties at the back or the impotency in the final third.

Firstly, why are Chelsea impotent in attack?

In the 4-3-3 system, Mata usually drifts inside during the build up which means Cole turns into the left winger and the whole defence has to shuffle accordingly and the DM has to cover for the missing defender and also ensure that the ball is spread around well (which is overburdening especially for someone like Romeu who’s still young). Meireles and Juan Mata’s threats are almost nullified because they’re blanketed by the opposition midfield. If the DM fails to do his job, and Chelsea are caught on the break gaping holes appear in the midfield which was evident against Villa. There were moments when Mata and Sturridge were seen next to each other and when the ball was played into the box, there was no one on the left hand side to receive it.

For the opposition it makes it painfully easy to defend against, as any space Sturridge may create would be killed by Mata who brings more defenders over to him. To sum up, the tactics were quite narrow because of the tendency of the wide men to cut inside and congest the midfield forcing Chelsea to build attacks from the wings. Opposition usually know that's it's only the full backs to worry about in the wide areas.

So this makes it obvious that the 4-2-3-1 system fares better with a left winger in Malouda and with Mata playing through the center which also increases supply to the striker. Even the frailties at the back will reduce because of the balance that is created. Indeed, there may be a lot of theories to describe the impotency in attack, the one described above is just one of them.

As far as the frailties at the back are considered, the whole system goes together. Chelsea have averaged 0.21 clean sheets per match in the premier league and have conceded 1.6 goals per match at home. Which is staggering and but a lot better compared to the 0.89 goals conceded away from home this season. The mere difference being the counter attacking system preferred away from home, is that it is more defensively focused and Chelsea adopt a deeper defensive line. And the opposite system which is used at home is far more attacking and Chelsea play a higher defensive line. The effectiveness of the two tactics are evident in Chelsea’s home and away record in the Premier League this season.

	Home	Away
Played	10	10
Won	6	5
Draws	1	3
Defeats	3	2
Goals scored	23	16
Goals conceded	16	9
Points	19	18

If Chelsea struggle to develop a consistent system and strategy, it will inevitably lead to Chelsea failing to make it into the top 4 this season.

Furthermore, financial difficulties could arise and with the Financial Fair Play rules coming into play from next season, one asks the question could all of this add up and create a recipe for the perfect disaster at Chelsea? We’ll have to wait and see.

AVB is a talented manager to find the solutions to Chelsea’s problems. But the biggest question is will he be given time?

This article was written by Chinmay Pandya, you can find his work at http://nimblefootwork.blog.com/ and you can follow him on Twitter: @_thesoccerist

3-5-2 - It's strengths and weaknesses

The Football Front’s tactical expert Itsaballnotabomb evaluates the 3-5-2 system and its strengths and weaknesses.

This formation is the exact opposite of the first famous formation, the 2-5-3. The 3-5-2 represents a complete turnaround in football philosophy since its beginning and it’s realisation was one of the main reasons for Jonathon Wilson’s book; Inverting the Pyramid, which you should really fucking read.

In defence, the three players provide excellent coverage against a two man attack. This is because it allows the side to have a free player, who, if one of the other defenders gets beaten they can cover for them.

Another common aspect of a three man defence is to have at least one defender who is confident enough on the ball to be able to bring it out and pick passes. These types of players can be rare these days but a converted midfielder can also be deployed there. This player used to be highly common and was used as a playmaker, who brought the ball out of defence, joined the midfield for the attack and then dropped deep to pick up any passes over the top. The role was called the libero, or the “free one”. However, the defence can be exposed. Firstly, if the teams midfield is caught high up the pitch it can lead the 3 man defence to be easily opened up. Secondly, a three man defence can encounter severe problems if it comes up against a three striker set up by the opposition.

The midfield is fairly similar to the 4-3-3 midfield, which I explained here. The extra man in the centre of the park when up against a 4-4-2 can be very useful at keeping the ball, whilst allowing one of the midfielders to find space so that they can create an opportunity for the two strikers.

A key component on the 3-5-2 is the wide midfielders. The wide midfielders need to provide width and defensive stability on the wings. They can be deployed further back, leading to a 5-3-2 formation. This role is probably the most physically demanding one in the formation because of the area in which both of the wide players need to cover.

Up front, the two strikers combine in much the same way as talked about previously when I discussed the 4-4-2 here. One of them may drop deep whilst the other plays on the shoulder of the opposition defence, or one of them may pull wide to provide width until the wide players get forward.

It all depends on the type of players which make up the squad and their individual traits.

The 3-5-2 is still commonly used in Serie A with both Udinese and Napoli using it. Both of these sides have overachieved in recent years as well showing how useful the formation can be.

Indeed, the use of 4-4-2 is still very prominent in Italy and this formation is one of the most effective against the 3-5-2 system.

The 3-5-2 is an underused formation in modern football. Although its a very useful formation when played against formations with less than three forwards. However, if the other side has three forwards though, it will be easier for them to score than it is in a brothel.

This article was written by Itsaballnotabomb, you can follow him on Twitter at - @ballnotabomb

You can find more of his work on his blog – itsaballnotabomb.wordpress.com

The Rise of the 'Nine and a Half'

In his debut article for The Football Front, Nick Meredith tackles the rise of the contemporary 'Nine and a Half' position.

Wayne Rooney is on a hot streak. His goal against Chelsea brought his domestic tally for this season to 10 goals in 6 starts. Relishing his deeper-lying role in United’s fluid 4-4-2/4-2-3-1 cross, he is both creator in chief and predatory goalscorer for his high-flying side.

It wasn’t always this way, though. In the 2010/11 season he suffered an early dip of form before roaring back as United’s focal point. Alongside the lethal Javier Hernandez, Rooney bagged 11 goals and as many assists. In the season before that, (the 2009/10 season), things were again slightly different: instead of being his side’s main creative outlet, he was their main goalscorer, scoring 26 goals as United were pipped to the title.

So the eternal question springs up, as it often does. What IS Rooney? For people trying to slot him into a specific role, it's a nightmare. Is he a classic ‘Number 10?', creating chances for others and roaming deep into midfield? The 2010/11 season would seem to suggest so. But what about another wonderful season he had, in the 2009/10 season? This was arguably his best season, Rooney was often deployed as a lone striker and was the main goalscorer of the team. So is he a ‘Number 9?’, a powerful focal point for the attack and the side’s main goal threat? This season would seem to suggest, he is somewhere in between.

The ‘nine and a half’

This season, Rooney has been deployed in the withdrawn position he made his own last season, but he has added the goalscoring prowess of the 2009/10 season. Rooney has been drifting around behind a striker such as Danny Welbeck or Hernandez, he has found space in which to both create and score. He is equally a goalscorer and a creator. The usual roles don’t apply here. He is far too complete to be classed as either a ‘9’ or ‘10’. In fact, he slots into a much rarer role: the ‘nine and a half’.

The idea of a ‘nine and a half’ isn’t new – Marco Van Basten was arguably its greatest exponent – but very few have the talent to carry it off. Finding a player complete enough that he can both create and score is hard enough, and finding one who is good enough to fulfil the role to its full extent is rarer still. The role is becoming more and more prevalent nowadays. However, due to the increasing completeness of footballers. Decades ago, a footballer could excel at one thing and make it into a team. Since then, the successes of Rinus Michel’s ‘Total Football’, Arrigo Sacchi’s ‘Gli Immortali’ and now the current Barcelona sides, in which universality was and is still the key, it has shaped footballers into much more rounded athletes. Even a decade ago, strikers like Robbie Fowler – who is short, not creative, not strong and not quick – could thrive in the Premier League because of his wonderful finishing. Perhaps, now he wouldn’t even get a look in.

Players like Lionel Messi, Wayne Rooney, Zlatan Ibrahimovic and Diego Forlan are all complete strikers and are excellent ‘nine and a half’s', on top of being truly world-class strikers. There are many 'nine and a half's' players in the modern game. In the Premier League alone, there are at least five – Rooney, Robin Van Persie, Sergio Aguero, Carlos Tevez and Luis Suarez. All five combine the twin talents of creativity and goalscoring. All of them are wonderful strikers, and are the Premier League’s best, which brings us onto the meat of this article.

The rise of the complete forward

Why are ‘nine and a half’s so effective? The simple answer could be their versatility, which of course, always make them an asset – for instance, Aguero has been used both playing off a main striker and as the main striker himself this season – but that is more to do with their worth to the team rather than their effectiveness on the pitch. In essence, the 9 ½‘s effectiveness is based around uncertainty. You have a variety of options to stop a forward, but realistically, you can only implement one. When faced with a striker who can do so much so well, how can you possibly defend against him?

Let’s compare Rooney to another top striker, say the ex-Inter poacher Samuel Eto’o. Both of them are wonderful players, but Eto’o, whilst a truly lethal finisher and one of the best strikers of the past decade, is clearly by no means a 9½. Creatively, he doesn’t have the vision and passing ability to be able to split the defence with an incisive through-ball or create a chance for another in such a way that real 9 ½s like Rooney or Messi can. What he does have is the aforementioned eye for goal, terrific movement and blistering pace. When faced with a pacey, clinical striker, the main worry for the defence is balls over the top and in behind the defence for him to chase, beating the defender with his pace in order to get in a one-on-one with the keeper. However, the easiest solution is for the defense to sit deep and allow the opposition to play in front of them, thus denying the striker space in behind for the rest of the team to roll balls through.

Try this with Rooney, though, and a whole new problem is opened up. A 9 ½ is equally happy to drop deep as he is up against a central defender, he can drop off and exploit the extra space that has opened up as a result. Whilst an opposition defence wouldn’t mind Eto’o doing this due to his creative skills being rather poor by comparison to the likes of Messi or Rooney, but allowing Rooney to do it would be suicide. With space and time on the ball and willing runners from midfield, Rooney can destroy any defence with ease.

So how DO you stop them?

Man-marking a dangerous player is a trick as old as football itself. Having a deep holding midfielder with strict man-marking instructions is all well and good, but unfortunately the 9 ½ is usually equal to it. If we take our case example of Rooney, he often drops even deeper thus, escaping the attentions of the deep midfielder or even leaving a gaping hole in front of the defence for others to exploit as the marker follows him (Fig. 1) . It could also lead to Rooney pushing up higher, forcing the midfielder to drop into the defence and leave a shortfall of numbers in midfield (Fig. 2).

Transparent positions show how each player started in the movement. Click to enlarge.

One final method could just be ignoring the 'nine and a half's' completely, and treating them like any other player. It goes without saying that this is an extremely risky gambit considering how most 9 ½s are such influential and talented players. Andre Villas-Boas arguably attempted this when his Chelsea side played against Manchester United, and achieved a partial success in that Rooney was relatively quiet compared to recent games. On the other hand, Rooney scored one goal, he hit the post, took five shots and won two dribbles. These stats are hardly calming, especially as its the opposition’s best striker.

So with most traditional methods useless, what could a manager use to stop a 9 ½? There are two possible solutions, one rather practical and another highly experimental. The first is to just set up with two deep holders, a 4-2-3-1 for instance. Uruguay did a variant of this in the World Cup, with their two destroyers, Diego Perez and Egidio Arevalo, solidly staying in front of their defence. If a 9 ½ ever tried dropping deep to find space, such as Holland’s Robin Van Persie did in their semi-final match, one of the two would track him. Van Persie was free to move as deep as he wanted, the other holding player remained in position sweeping in front of the defence (Fig. 3). In this case, this was complicated by the presence of Wesley Sneijder playing as a trequartista, though Uruguay got around that by fielding another solid central midfielder, Walter Gargano, ahead of the midfield pivot. Gargano was comfortable dropping in and helping out with the defensive legwork. Although Uruguay lost the game, it would be hard to blame the midfield holders for doing their job, or indeed to praise a relatively ineffective Van Persie. But the knock-on effect of this, of course, is that unless the midfield destroyers are very talented the team loses it's passing ability from the centre of the pitch, effecting fluidity as a result.

The second method involves using a zonal marking system in order to keep the 9 ½ tracked across the pitch without compromising shape. Instead of using a strict man-marker, when a 9 ½ tries moving deep or out of the man-marker’s comfortable range, he passes him onto a more advanced midfielder higher up the pitch. In theory, this would work perfectly. In practice, the move is extremely difficult to pull off, requiring exceptional teamwork and awareness on the pitch by the defenders.

How the 9 ½ role will develop remains to be seen, but as footballers get more and more well rounded, new ways of stopping 9 ½s will be developed. I mentioned at the start of this article that strikers are becoming less one-dimensional, but the same is also true of defenders. Nowadays cultured defenders like Gerard Pique, David Luiz and Thomas Vermaelen are becoming much more prevalent. With their ability to step out of defence and into midfield, they can track the deeper movements of strikers with more ease than ever before. This will only aid them in the constant tactical battle between defenders and strikers. As it is, finding cultured defenders is hard, and the ‘nine and a half’ continues to be one of the most potent weapons a manager can bring to bear on the field.

This article was written by Nick Meredith, you can find all of his work for The Football Front here. Make sure you follow him on Twitter too: @NTMeredith. Nick also runs the fantastic Dots & Crosses website too - http://dotsandcrosses.wordpress.com/

4-3-3 - it's Successes and Failings

The Football Front’s tactical expert Itsaballnotabomb evaluates the 4-3-3 system and its strengths and weaknesses.

The 4-3-3 has shot to fame recently. It was made famous by the Dutch sides of the 70’s and is synonymous with Total football, which was created in that period.

For a 4-3-3 to be effective each player must control his zone. Zonal marking is used for all positions, as it makes it easier to press effectively. The only time zonal marking isn’t used is when the ball is about to be put in the box, at this point the marking switches to man marking for obvious reasons.

There are many ways in which a 4-3-3 can be used because of its flexibility. Some sides such as Bolton under Sam Allardyce used it as a counter-attacking formation. The back 4 generally would stay back while the wingers would try to play off the target man striker, normally Kevin Davies. The wingers would also provide service to the target man through crosses. The wingers though would play more like wide midfielders and would happily track back into their own half, much like Mourinho’s Chelsea.

Another way it can be used is in a very attacking sense. Here, the wingers would normally stay forward with the striker. All 3 midfielders may also have the license to make forward runs and try and support the attacking trio. If the wingers are pushing more centrally, or playing as inverted forwards, this will often mean that the full backs will push high up the pitch and become wingers themselves. A great example of this is Marcelo and Cristiano Ronaldo last season, Marcelo's runs forward allowed Ronaldo to cut in on his right foot to great effect for Real Madrid.

With the front three it also makes pressing high up the pitch easier than with a 4-4-2 formation, purely because the 4-3-3 formation is naturally further forward than a 4-4-2. A great example of pressing is the Dutch side in the 1974 World Cup, although this would be hard to recreate now due to the change of the offside law. When pressing, the side will try to force the team inside as this is where the 4-3-3 has a numerical advantage; it will also stop a long ball straight up one of the flanks which can be potentially devastating as the full back can get out numbered if the midfield is not quick enough to cover.

At all times in the 4-3-3 one of the midfielders will sit in front of the defence to form a defensive triangle and a midfield triangle. Defensively this is a very solid formation and can be hard to break down as each position is well covered by another player. The midfield diamond also allows a side to keep possession easily, especially if there is a numerical advantage in midfield. A great example of this in recent times is Barcelona. The midfield switches positions and rotates, constantly making space for a pass, Messi also joins in from his traditional striking position and adds another man to the midfield, making it even easier to maintain possession. This is especially effective against teams who play two in the middle. (see diagram above.)

A weakness of the 4-3-3 is the demands that it puts on the side. If a side is not well drilled it can be easily picked apart, especially if the pressing is poor. The flanks can also be easily exposed by a cross field ball as it can leave a 2 on 1 situation with the fullback and opposition winger. But this can be reduced if the winger is prepared to track back and follow the full back. But the flip side of this is that it can make the striker isolated.

The striker in this formation has a very demanding role as well. Not only has he got the responsibility of scoring goals but the striker also needs to be able to hold the ball up. The striker also needs the technical proficiency to drop into the midfield and then have the ability to pick a pass. More crucially, if the centre forward does not link the midfield with the attack the side can become predictable and very easy to defend against. Arsene Wenger found this out a couple of seasons ago when Robin Van Persie got injured. A good number 10 needs to have all the attributes needed to play up front in a 4-3-3. Unfortunately for Wenger he had no replacement for the striker and Arsenal's goal scoring and form dipped considerably.

All in all, the 4-3-3 can be a very attacking or defensive formation and its flexibility is one of the reasons why it's gaining more popularity in recent times. However, the high demands on the players and the technical ability needed, can often mean that lesser sides struggle to get success from the 4-3-3.

This article was written by Itsaballnotabomb, you can follow him on Twitter at - @ballnotabomb

You can find more of his work on his blog – itsaballnotabomb.wordpress.com

Things you may like to read

4-4-2- its failings and it's former successes

The Contemporary 4-2-3-1 and its modern popularity

England’s new 4-3-3 system, the platform for English success? – Part Two

The contemporary 4-2-3-1 and its modern popularity

The Football Front’s writer Itsaballnotabomb evaluates the 4-2-3-1.

So over to our tactical expert.

The 4-2-3-1 was reportedly created in Spain by Josep Guardiola’s mentor Juanma Lillo. Lillo created the formation in the early 1990′s for his side at the time, Cultural Leonesa. But even he believes that someone might have created it before die to a variation of a 4-4-2.

The popularity of the formation was seen in the last World Cup where only mad dogs and Englishmen chose not to play the formation. So why has it become so popular? One formation is never inexplicably better than another, the 4-4-2 will not always lose to a 4-3-3. However, formations become fashionable, like any other trail of thought, and so gets played more, even if it does not necessarily fit into a clubs philosophy or playing staff.

One of the positives of a 4-2-3-1 is the defensive cover it provides, especially centrally. This is because the 2 holding midfield players or the double pivot, tend not to go forward as much. Therefore, if the opposition counter attacks, there will still be 5 players back, even if one of the full backs has pushed forward.

Another use of the double pivot is that it prevents the classic number 10 role or the playmaking role just behind the striker. With the two defensive midfielders there, it can be almost impossible for the attacking midfielder to find space and create due to the player being doubled up on.

As with any 2 midfield players though, one is usually more attack minded than the other and there can be a lot of variants in the way in which these two players set up, although one normally has a creative role than the other. For example, Real Madrid last season used the 4-2-3-1 fairly successfully. The Madrid club used Xabi Alonso and either Lassana Diarra or Sami Khedira. Xabi Alonso played as a deep-lying playmaker to great effect, whilst the other player played simple passes but closed down more aggressively and put more tackles in.

The front 4 in the 4-2-3-1 can also provide the side with great flexibility up front. The attacking midfielders can be set up in a narrow formation where essentially all of them play as Trequartistas, the width in this set-up will be provided by the full backs. The formation can also be played with traditional wingers, or with inside forwards who would cut in towards the goal, in this case, the wingers will yet again will have the duty of providing width.

With the 6 defensive players behind them the attacking four have a lot of freedom and may also change positions with each other through-out the match. This can create confusion for the oppositions defence, especially if they use man marking.

As with any formation that has a player behind the striker, there is a lot of pressure on that player to try and create for the other players, especially the striker. If this player plays well, which is more easily done against a 4-4-2 than a 4-3-3 or 4-2-3-1 due to the space between the defence and midfield which I explained here. l, the team will function a lot better. Mezut Ozil has proved himself to be one of the best players in this position because of his great movement off the ball and eye for a defence splitting pass, shown by his performances for Germany and Real Madrid last year.

One problem which often happens with a 4-2-3-1 is that there is not a link between the 6 at the back and the 4 up front. Often the six do not support the attacking players, just leaving them to try and score whilst they leave the six to try and defend. These sides often lack fluidity and the opposition can find it very easy to defend unless the other side counter attacks efficiently.

Another problem that can happen is if the wingers or wide attacking midfield players do not track back. This can lead to a 2 v 1 situation with the full backs which can also happen in a 4-3-3 which I explained here.

Yet again, as with any formation there are positives and negatives. What the coach needs to do, is choose the best formation so that he can contain the side he is playing against and also exploit them. He also needs to pick the best formation for his players and his club. For example, you cannot imagine anyone playing any thing else than 3 in midfield at Barcelona as it does not suit their passing style.

This article was written by Itsaballnotabomb, you can follow him on Twitter at - @ballnotabomb

You can find more of his work on his blog - itsaballnotabomb.wordpress.com

Things you may like to read

4-4-2- its failings and it's former successes

Is there a right or wrong way to play football?

England’s new 4-3-3 system, the platform for English success? – Part Two

Andre Villas - Boas Scouting report v Newcastle 2005

This is incredible. Below is a scouting report from the new Chelsea boss Andre Villas-Boas. The report is highly in-depth and is intriguing to read.

This document really gives you an insight to the level of preparation and the high degree of tactical scouting which is done in professional football. Not only this, the document also shows the sharp tactical acumen of Villas-Boas.

If you're interested, Chelsea won the game Villas-Boas was scouting by 3 goals to nil.

Boas leaked report

View more presentations from 03akkasi.

Here is a larger version

Things you may like to read

The Eternal Struggle - http://tiny.cc/1hl0v

Why Chelsea must drop Fernando Torres if they are to have any chance of success this season - http://tiny.cc/a3o11

Jose Mourinho. The ultimate manager or the ultimate journey man? - http://tiny.cc/ii8te

Is there a Right or Wrong way to play Football?

Football is changing. Our perceptions on football are changing. We are becoming more and more conscious of how our team plays. Some will argue that were becoming even more critical of how our teams play. The press, opposing players and managers are continuously criticising their opponents’ strategies.

But is this fair? Are we in an age where football has to conform to what the football society deems as acceptable? Football is an art. It’s a game where different cultures and strategies go head to head, and some of the most fantastic entertainment stems from that. Obviously football has to be played within the laws of the game. But why are certain footballing strategies deemed as ‘the wrong way of playing football?’

A perfect example of this was Cesc Fabregas’ comments after Arsenal were defeated by Ipswich. ‘I don’t know if it is long ball or it is a rugby kick.’ It’s an injustice that the captain of Arsenal can criticise the opposing teams strategy. What exactly did Ipswich do wrong? They played within the rules and found away to beat Arsenal. Fair play to them. But Fabregas and Arsenal aren’t the only player and club to criticise an opposition strategy. It’s happening more and more now. It’s as if clubs and players are saying, everyone needs to play in our way, or if there not they are not playing the game properly. But surely part of the game of the game is being able to overcome the opposition’s tactics and strategies. It shows the weak mentality of some footballers and managers who think football has to be played in a certain brand.

Nowadays, it’s seems like a complete sin if you play defensive football. You are branded labels such as being ‘anti football.’ Defensive football is simply just keeping it tight at the back and as a unit. And reducing the number of chances the opposition gets. While attacking in a pragmatic manner. Is that a crime? Where in the rules of football does it say your not allowed to have men behind the ball? It’s ridiculous when people criticise this strategy. They are playing defensively because they want to increase their chance of getting something out of this game. They don’t want to hand the result to their opposition.

The phrase ‘anti-football’ has been branded quite easily over the past few years. Even Chelsea were branded that tag when they played against Barcelona in the Champions League semi final in 2009. Andres Iniesta commented, ‘We [Barcelona] tried to attack and score a goal, but when the team in front of you [Chelsea] do not want to play football, it becomes complicated.’ It’s an incredibly harsh comment towards Chelsea. They haven’t got to the Champions League semi final by ‘not playing football.’ Of course they have played football. Can’t Chelsea play defensively against the favourites, especially as Barcelona are at home? Its crazy. Suddenly playing pragmatically is a crime and is the 'wrong way' to play football. Chelsea are well within their rights to play in a strategy which they believe will assist them in getting through the ties. There is nothing wrong with that. Some players and clubs can’t take it if a team plays football which is directly built to nullify their opposition’s strategy. As Chelsea did with Barcelona’s in the first leg. Chelsea have done nothing wrong.

Closer to home Stoke are often labelled as a ‘direct and physical’ side. Which to be honest, they are. And I don’t think manager Tony Pulis nor the Stoke players will deny that either. But Stoke come under great criticism for being a physical side and direct side. Fulham Captain Danny Murphy heavily condemned Stoke’s strategy, ‘you get managers who set their teams out to stop the other teams playing which is happening more and more like Stoke.’ The most provoking aspect is that Stoke are playing by the book. It’s a common assertion that because they are a physical side it means Stoke fouls a lot. It doesn’t mean that at all. It simply means they are physically stronger than their oppositions. It’s as if the modern football forgets that football is a contact sport. Stoke are well in their right to assert their physical attributes as long as it’s within the law. It doesn’t mean Stoke are playing football the ‘wrong way.’ It simply means they are playing to their strengths.

Stoke’s throw-in specialties have also come under criticism. Just because the tactic is unorthodox it suddenly becomes the ‘wrong way to play football.’ Yet, Stoke’s tactic is faultless. They are not infringing any laws. There simply better than other teams when it comes to taking advantage of throw-ins. But this still gives them the label of being ‘Anti football.’

Nobody has the right to question Stoke’s strategy. After all it works. Stoke were promoted to the Premier League with Hull and West Brom. Hull have been relegated. Whereas, West Brom were relegated then promoted again. During that time Stoke have continuously kept in the Premier League. You can’t knock Stoke’s tactics.

One thing which I’ve recognised in the past few seasons is that whenever a team play the ball long, or clear it long, it's met with boo’s. This demonstrates how conscience the fans have become over the idea of playing the ‘long ball.’ But these boo’s send out a clear message. It suggests that playing the long ball isn’t accepted in the footballing culture anymore. This is rather sad. As it’s not anti football or the wrong way to play football. It’s simply another strategy, yes, its not the most aesthetically pleasing but if it works for the team so be it.

Nowadays, when a new manager joins a club they always seem to promise to play an ‘attacking brand of football.’ That’s all and well. But it’s easy to forget that, you need to play to your team’s strengths in order to be successful. Some teams playing lovely passing football as it’s their strength. But for other teams playing defensively and on the counter is their strength. Is that a crime? No. But the way football is portrayed nowadays its as if it’s a crime to play like that. Even though their playing to the their strengths and within the rules.

For me the beauty of football is two opposing teams with different styles battling it out. But it seems that all teams need to play in a certain way, the ‘attacking brand’ strategy. How boring would it be if every team played like Barcelona. The beauty about Barcelona’s play is that they are the only club in the world who can play like that. Football needs to encourage different styles of play, rather than criticising certain styles and branding them as ‘anti-football.’

Football is an art. Let’s not lose the beauty of the game.